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INTRODUCTION 
The sharing economy has much to offer women.  Through this 
economy, a person can be productive on a flexible schedule, outside 
the rigid forty-hour workweek of a conventional job.  Those who have 
extra time, spare room, underutilized talents, or products they no 
longer need can find markets for their surpluses, without the need for 
highly capitalized corporate distribution channels.1  Buyers, too, have 
more market flexibility.  They have many more choices available to 
them, and through auctions or other bidding devices they can 
sometimes reach terms with sellers on a decentralized basis rather 
than on the more customary take-it-or-leave-it basis.  Participants in 
the sharing economy often exchange information about each other in 
order to address privacy, safety, or other concerns they might have, 
and then use this information to decide with whom to do business.  
The opportunities to give and receive individual feedback also allow 
buyers and sellers to better evaluate the trustworthiness of their 
potential trading partner or the quality of the product in advance, as 
well as to express their pleasure or disappointment with a transaction.  
In these ways and others, the sharing economy promotes flexibility, 
                                                                                                                                         
* A. Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal for initiating what has become for me a continuing and 
fruitful interaction with Naomi Schoenbaum on issues of discrimination in the sharing 
economy.  
 1. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 34 (2016) (describing the sharing economy as “uniquely 
comprised of individuals profiting from their personal excess capacity”). 
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networking, trust, cooperative relationships, and communication—all 
things that women are thought to especially value.2 
In Gender and the Sharing Economy, Professor Schoenbaum 
challenges this utopic vision.  She argues that, despite the features 
outlined above—indeed, to a certain extent, because of them—the 
sharing economy risks deepening and legitimating gender stereotypes 
and thereby harming women.3  The problem is not that the features of 
the sharing economy described above are not valuable.  It is that the 
flexibility, connection, and trust that speak to women’s short-term 
circumstances and values come at the expense of women’s more 
important, long-term interest in gender equality.4 
Professor Schoenbaum’s cautionary tale has several discrete and 
interactive parts.  First, she explains that the sharing economy is 
disproportionately concentrated in intimate settings like personal 
homes and cars (rather than, say, offices and stores), and in personal 
services such as house-cleaning, outside chores, dog-walking, 
carpooling, roommate matching, and childcare (rather than more 
traditionally commodified goods and services).5  Second, the intimacy 
of these transactions raises concerns by those involved in these 
transactions for privacy, comfort, sexual autonomy, and safety—
concerns that tend to increase the salience of sex and, consequently, 
the strength and acceptability of gender stereotypes.6  Third, the 
sharing economy is more likely than traditional market transactions 
to involve the exchange of personal information, which arguably 
reduces transactional risk, but at the same time, again, facilitates sex 
discrimination.7  Finally, the sharing economy lacks the structural 
constraints, including applicable anti-discrimination laws, corporate 
                                                                                                                                         
 2. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Gender and the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1023, 1024-25 (2016).  Basic works in legal scholarship exploring the 
traditionally female or feminine values of community relationship, trust, 
interdependence, and cooperation, include Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (2002); Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist 
Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); 
Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).  The notion that 
these characteristics are women’s values, as opposed to, say, values attributed to 
women to serve men’s interests, is heavily disputed within feminism. See CATHARINE 
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 38-39 
(1987) (criticizing relational feminism for “making it seem as though [traditional 
feminine] attributes, with their consequences, really are somehow ours, rather than 
what male supremacy has attributed to us for its own use”). 
 3. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1027, 1051. 
 4. Id. at 1051. 
 5. Id. at 1029-32. 
 6. Id. at 1038-1050. 
 7. Id. at 1032-35. 
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enforcement structures, and worker interactions, that constrain 
discrimination in traditional business.8  What Professor Schoenbaum 
fears, ultimately, is that the breakdown in nondiscrimination norms in 
the sharing economy will alter gender equality norms more generally, 
and thus to subvert the progress society has made over the years.9 
Professor Schoenbaum’s article is the first serious scholarship to 
examine the sharing economy’s implications for gender equality and, 
as such, makes a huge contribution to the growing literature in this 
field.  In this response, I offer four observations that highlight and 
elaborate some of its important insights.10 
I.  BEYOND THE SHARING ECONOMY 
Professor Schoenbaum observes that the extension of existing sex 
discrimination law to the sharing economy will not necessarily 
alleviate the gender issues she identifies.11  This point warrants some 
emphasis and extension.  A number of features of existing law detract 
from the law’s ability to contain gender discrimination, even in the 
traditional economy.  For example, as Professor Schoenbaum 
mentions,12 current law only addresses the behavior of businesses, not 
customers.13  Ordinarily, when society deems certain behavior 
harmful enough, it regulates that behavior on both the demand side 
and the supply side.14  Why society treats discrimination differently 
                                                                                                                                         
 8. Id. at 1058-68. 
 9. Id. at 1050-51. 
 10. Many of these insights draw from work I have done with Mitu Gulati.  See 
Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
223 (2016). 
 11. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1063-68. 
 12. Id. 1063, 1065. 
 13. Theoretically, section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2012), prohibits race discrimination by individuals and business entities alike, but 
section 1981 does not concern gender and, in any event, has not generated 
discrimination suits against individual customers. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 
10.  All other civil rights statutes regulate only the behavior of providers, not 
customers, and even then, apply only when the business reaches a certain size, as 
determined by the number of employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(B)(ii) (year) 
(stating that the Family and Medical Leave Act is not applicable to businesses with 
less than fifty employees); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012) (exempting establishments 
with not more than five rooms in which owner is a resident from prohibition against 
discrimination in places of public accommodation); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) 
(stating that employment discrimination law is applicable to employers with fifteen or 
more employees); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2012) (stating prohibition of discrimination 
against the disabled applicable only to employers with fifteen or more employees).  
 14. Examples include bribery, prostitution, transactions in body parts, illegal 
drugs, and guns. 
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from other harmful behaviors is beyond the scope of this response, 
but the fact is that the law prohibits only business sellers from 
discriminating, not individual customers.15  This matters, for while the 
prohibition of discrimination by businesses makes discrimination by 
customers more difficult, there are still plenty of opportunities for 
customers, both online and in brick-and-mortar stores, to make 
discriminatory choices about with whom to do business,16 how much 
to pay17 or tip,18 and how to evaluate the service they received.19 
Other limitations of anti-discrimination law also affect the law’s 
ability to contain sex discrimination in both traditional and online 
economies.  For example, the bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) exception to Title VII allows employers to make sex-based 
distinctions that they believe are essential to their businesses.20  These 
distinctions are often grounded in the discriminatory preferences of 
                                                                                                                                         
 15. For more detailed examination of the question of discrimination by 
customers, including possible rationales for existing law, see Bartlett & Gulati, supra 
note 10. 
 16. See Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and 
Online Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. F469, F470 (2013) (explaining a study of 
online sales of iPods showed that iPods depicted in white hands sold far better than 
iPods in black hands); Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing 
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Apr. 
2017, at 1 (showing that Airbnb guests with distinctively African-American names 
are roughly sixteen percent less likely to be accepted by hosts than identical guests 
not identifiable as non-white). 
 17. See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J. ECON. 891, 891 
(2015) (showing that baseball cards depicted in a black hand sold for twenty percent 
less than the same cards in a white hand); Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, 
Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper, 
No. 14-054, 2014), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/digital-discrimination-the-case-of-
airbnb-com [https://perma.cc/F3Z5-D7CG] (showing non-black hosts on Airbnb get 
twelve percent more than black hosts for comparable property). 
 18. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab 
Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005) (discussing a study of over 1,000 taxicab trips in 
New Haven found that customers tip African-American cab drivers one-third less 
than white cab drivers and stiff them eighty percent more often); Matthew Parrett, 
Customer Discrimination in Restaurants: Dining Frequency Matters, 32 J. LABOR 
RES. 87 (2011) (discussing a study of data collected outside five Virginia restaurants 
found that customers tip female servers less than men, unless their customers are 
regular patrons or the service quality is exceptional). 
 19. See Bryce Covert, Female Client Service Reps Get Lower Scores Despite 
Better Performance and Experience, THINKPROGRESS (May 22, 2014), 
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/05/22/3440725/wordstream/ [https://perma.cc/
63Z4-ACGM] (discussing a study of customer representative evaluations showing 
that female marketers are undervalued by twenty-one percent). 
 20. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 10. 
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customers and, in turn, help to perpetuate those preferences.21  
Similarly, not all public accommodations laws prohibit sex-exclusive 
policies even in traditional business settings such as women’s gyms, 
public bathrooms, and “ladies nights,” especially where these 
exclusions are supported by widespread customer preferences—
preferences that are, as a consequence, reinforced.22 
The barriers courts have imposed to the enforcement of Title VII’s 
prohibition of disparate impact discrimination also limit the 
obligation of both online and traditional businesses to avoid practices 
that have a discriminatory impact on their employees or customers.23  
Moreover, no law prevents, or could prevent, businesses from 
marketing goods and services in ways that reinforce gender 
stereotypes, both online and in traditional business.24 
I mean simply to emphasize Professor Schoenbaum’s point that the 
discrimination problems raised by the sharing economy will not be 
resolved simply by extending existing law to that economy.  There are 
long-standing realities and legal barriers that make it difficult to 
contain sex discrimination in whichever economy it functions. 
II.  BEYOND INTIMACY 
For Professor Schoenbaum, the intimacy of services and 
transactions in the sharing economy makes sex salient, and that 
                                                                                                                                         
 21. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding exclusion of 
women as guards in high-security men’s prisons); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 
391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding sex as a BFOQ in case in which only women 
were hired to guard female prisoners); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. 
Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff’d mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding hiring 
of only female nurses as a BFOQ when nursing home’s residents strenuously 
objected to male nurses). These precedents are eroding. See, e.g., Breiner v. Nev. 
Dep’t of Corr., 601 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting BFOQ for female guards in 
female prisons); Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., 594 S.Ed.2d 616 (W. Va. 
2004) (striking down hospital policy of hiring only female obstetric nurses). 
 22. For an analysis of ladies’ nights, see RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS 
GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2012). 
 23. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 10. 
 24. See Emma Gray, ‘This Oppresses Women’ Stickers Give Body-Shaming Ads 
The Edit They So Desperately Need, HUFFPOST WOMEN (June 22, 2015) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/22/this-oppresses-women-stickers-shut-down-
sexist-nyc-ads_n_7637564.html [https://perma.cc/H5S5-659R]; Amanda Scherker, 14 
Times Women Were Sexed Up For Absolutely No Logical Reason, HUFFPOST 
WOMEN (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/women-sexist-
media_n_5792960.html [https://perma.cc/4XTA-RTKP]; Anita Little, Top Five Sexist 
Super Bowl Ads, 2013, MS. BLOG (Feb. 4, 2013), http://msmagazine.com/blog/
2013/02/04/top-five-sexist-super-bowl-ads-2013/ [https://perma.cc/4XTA-RTKP]; see 
also Sexist Advertising, PINTEREST, https://www.pinterest.com/jarrahpenguin/sexist-
advertising/ [https://perma.cc/NUP3-QH89]. 
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salience then facilitates and legitimates gender stereotyping.25  
Professor Schoenbaum associates this greater intimacy with the 
blurring of lines between home, workplace, and the market.26  The 
traditional market paradigm, Professor Schoenbaum asserts, was 
based on clear divisions between these three domains.  In breaking 
down these clear divisions, the sharing economy has brought the 
market into intimacy and intimacy into the market.27 
While the breakdown in boundaries between home, workplace, 
and market that Professor Schoenbaum associates with intimacy is a 
significant factor that impacts gender stereotypes in the sharing 
economy, it is not the only one.  Another breakdown that complicates 
the regulatory picture is the blurring of the traditional line between 
buyers and sellers.  In the traditional economy, parties to a 
transaction are either sellers (usually businesses) or buyers (usually 
individuals).  In the online, sharing world, platforms do not sell, in the 
traditional sense; rather, they match sellers with buyers.  In this world, 
sellers and buyers are both customers of the platforms, and therefore 
not subject to the anti-discrimination laws applicable to business 
sellers in traditional markets.28 
Lending Club, for example, matches borrowers and “investors.”29  
By law, lenders may not discriminate in their lending practices.30  Yet 
because Lending Club only matches individual customers with money 
to invest with individual customers who need money, it is not clear 
who, if anyone, is to be regulated.31  Similarly, Airbnb hosts are 
customers of the platform just as guests are, with neither subject to 
anti-discrimination rules with respect to their online transaction with 
each other.32  This role confusion does not depend upon the intimacy 
of the goods or services made available; it applies as much to Lending 
Club and eBay as to Match.com.  Yet it may be a very significant 
                                                                                                                                         
 25. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1036-46. 
 26. Id. at 1029-30. 
 27. Id. at 1029-32. 
 28. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 10. 
 29. See LENDINGTREE, https://www.lendingtree.com/ [https://perma.cc/GTG5-
EQRH]. 
 30. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691f (2012). 
 31. See Kadhim Shubber, Lenders Can’t Discriminate, But What About 
Investors?, FT ALPHAVILLE (Jan. 13, 2016), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/01/13/
2150093/lenders-cant-discriminate-but-what-about-investors/ [https://perma.cc/QL6S-
FAGM]. 
 32. See supra notes 16-17 (documenting discrimination by both hosts and guests 
on Airbnb). 
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factor in the sharing economy’s ability to evade anti-discrimination 
rules. 
III.  BEYOND CHOICE 
The sharing economy proliferates choices for its participants; this 
is, indeed, one of its most appealing features.  Among the valuable 
take-aways from Professor Schoenbaum’s article, however, is the 
reminder that what may increase choice for some may decrease it for 
others.33  Importantly, the effects of choice are not random.  
Although many of Professor Schoenbaum’s choices involve female 
consumers choosing female providers, the main consequence of the 
dynamic she describes is that customers devalue women in the online 
marketplace.34 
As Professor Schoenbaum points out, the trade-off between choice 
and nondiscrimination values exists, as well, within the traditional 
economy.35  Two things drive the trade-off in the sharing economy 
further away from nondiscrimination values in the direction of greater 
choice.  First, as Professor Schoenbaum points out,36 the sharing 
economy lacks the institutional structures, such as corporate equal 
employment opportunity (EEO) procedures, worker interactions, and 
systems of accountability, that the traditional economy relies upon to 
contain discrimination.37 
Second—and, here, I speculate—the exploding availability of 
online choices can be expected to strengthen the value attached to 
choice.  Insofar as norms are socially constructed through societal 
practices, laws, and relationships, what we get used to often becomes 
what we expect, and thus what we value.  There is indirect evidence 
for this phenomenon in the research suggesting that studying 
economics, which assumes people make rational, self-interested 
decisions, makes people more self-interested—or selfish—in their 
everyday behaviors.38  In the same way, accustoming customers to 
                                                                                                                                         
 33. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1054. 
 34. See supra notes 18-21. 
 35. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1054. 
 36. Id. at 1038. 
 37. Id. at 1038, 1063-68. 
 38. The literature is massive on this point. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank et al., Does 
Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993) (supporting 
the hypothesis that economics are more likely to free ride and that lower levels in 
cooperativeness by economists can be explained, in part, by their training); 
Long Wang et al., Economics Education and Greed, 10 ACAD. MGMT. & EDUC. 643 
(2011) (reporting studies showing that economics majors kept more money for 
themselves in money allocation task and that economics students showed more 
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endless choices through the sharing economy can be expected to 
normalize and heighten the value society places on choice.  
Accordingly, users in the online economy can be expected to place 
increasing value on choice, at the expense of values deemphasized in 
this economy, like nondiscrimination. 
These institutional and expressive dimensions work together.  The 
sharing economy raises the societal commitment to choice, at the 
same time that it fails to provide a substitute for the regularized 
procedures and institutions that are used to discourage discriminatory 
choices in traditional markets. 
IV.  BEYOND ANTI-STEREOTYPING 
Professor Schoenbaum takes the position that all sex-based 
stereotypes should be eliminated, whether or not they serve women’s 
present interests.39  Any compromise on this, she suggests, ultimately 
undermines women’s long-term interests in sex equality.40  
Specifically, she disapproves of allowing women to exercise a 
discriminatory preference for a female gynecologist,41 housekeeper,42 
or cab driver.43 
Insofar as the market for many services in which people are likely 
to have a sex-based preference is expanding through the sharing 
economy—this is a fundamental proposition of the article, although 
not one that Professor Schoenbaum is able to quantify—it seems 
correct that the sharing economy will increase sex-based 
discrimination.  Still, I wonder—and perhaps this makes me an 
example of the diminishing commitment to eliminating gender 
stereotypes that Professor Schoenbaum warns us about44—if an 
                                                                                                                                         
positive attitudes toward greed).  There is some dispute about the extent to which the 
higher amount of free riding among economics students is a result of economic 
training and how much is a function of the characteristics of those who decide to 
major in economics. See Yoram Bauman & Elaina Rose, Selection or Indoctrination: 
Why Do Economics Students Donate Less Than the Rest?, 79 J. ECON. BEHAV. & 
ORG. 318 (2011). 
 39. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1054-57. 
 40. Id. at 1054-55. 
 41. Id. at 1054. 
 42. Id. at 1055-56. 
 43. Id. at 1048-49, 1053. 
 44. I have been, in the past, a strong proponent of the elimination of all sex-based 
distinctions. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 829 (1990); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and 
Appearances Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 2541 (1994); Katharine T. Bartlett, Unconstitutionally Male?: The Story of 
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approach that rules all sex-based choices out of bounds is the wisest 
course. 
My concerns are based, in part, on principle.  Women have reasons, 
rooted in the here and now, for preferring women cab drivers, 
household workers, masseuses, and even gynecologists.  We can say, 
as Professor Schoenbaum does,45 that society’s focus should be on 
making women safer and more comfortable with male providers, not 
avoiding them, and I would agree.  But, under present circumstances, 
it is not a fully satisfactory strategy.  Facing real vulnerability, if 
women’s autonomy means anything, it should include being able to 
make their own decisions about how to secure their own comfort and 
safety.  In other words, women must have the tools to negotiate their 
real lives, not their ideal ones. 
Other concerns are strategic.  On the negative side, social science 
research suggests that anti-discrimination mandates that too deeply 
offend a person’s sense of identity and selfhood can be 
counterproductive, reinforcing rather than correcting the underlying 
discriminatory impulses that drive, explicitly and implicitly, 
discriminatory behavior.46  The extent of that offense and its potential 
to undermine society’s ongoing commitment to ending discrimination 
is disturbingly evident in the 2016 presidential campaign cycle.47 
On the positive side, some sex-based preferences have helped to 
create markets that have long been discriminatory—including, 
presumably, the preferences for female gynecologists to which 
Professor Schoenbaum refers.48  The ability to make consumer 
decisions that are sex-based, but deliberately designed to undermine 
sexism, is also apparent in well-known examples of collective, gender-
based consumer action, such as the “girlcott” organized against 
                                                                                                                                         
United States v. Virginia, in WOMEN AND THE LAW: STORIES 133 (Elizabeth M. 
Schneider & Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011). 
 45. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1056-57. 
 46. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical 
Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1893, 1936-41 (2009). 
 47. See Andrew Rosenthal, Donald Trump’s Critics Aren’t ‘Politically Correct.’ 
They’re Outraged, N.Y. TIMES: TAKING NOTE (Aug. 27, 2015), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/27/donald-trumps-critics-arent-
politically-correct-theyre-outraged/?module=BlogPost-ReadMore&version=Blog20
Main&action=Click&pgtype=Blogs&region=Body [https://perma.cc/2EKF-B2CA] 
(noting the appeal of Trump to those who “resent being called to account for 
intolerance and discrimination”). 
 48. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1054. 
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Abercrombie & Fitch to combat the negative female body images 
fostered in the company’s advertising campaigns of the 1990s.49 
The lines between “good” sex-based choices and “bad” ones are 
hard to draw.  I think, though, that a focus on these lines and their 
malleability is likely to be more productive, long-term, than an 
ironclad rule that admits of no short-term, sex-based preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Schoenbaum closes by saying that she is not opposed to 
the sharing economy but instead seeks measures that might mitigate 
its burdens to women’s equality.  To be realistic, there is no turning 
back from the sharing economy.  The sharing economy is no more 
likely to be curtailed because of the enhanced risks of discrimination 
than advances in information technology are likely to be reversed 
because of the incursions these advances represent to citizen 
privacy.50  All we can hope for are measures that mediate its worst 
effects. 
Among the concrete suggestions Professor Schoenbaum offers for 
further consideration are a limit on online disclosures of the kind of 
identifying information that allows users of the sharing economy to 
discriminate based on sex,51 and the imposition of greater burdens on 
online platforms to anticipate and prevent discrimination by its 
users.52  These will be difficult reforms to enact.  If Professor 
Schoenbaum is right, the sharing economy exerts subtle pressure to 
expand the BFOQ exception to Title VII, not make it more 
restrictive.53  Moreover, as I argued above, as people become more 
accustomed to the choice and flexibility offered through the sharing 
economy, the resistance to limits on those choices is sure to increase. 
                                                                                                                                         
 49. See Lauren Johnson, Abercrombie & Fitch Supports Racism, Sexism and Size 
Discrimination, BEUTIFUL (May 10, 2013), http://www.beutifulmagazine.com/2013/05/
10/abercrombie-fitch-supports-racism-sexism-size-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/
QNR9-4UQG]. 
 50. See generally TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. 
Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998); see also The Fundamental Limits of Privacy For 
Social Networks, MIT TECH. REV (May 5, 2010),  http://www.technologyreview.com/
view/418819/the-fundamental-limits-of-privacy-for-social-networks/ [https://perma.cc/
D7SZ-QPDG] (arguing that using social networks to make recommendations will 
always compromise privacy). 
 51. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, at 1069. 
 52. Id. at 1069-70.  For further suggestions along these lines, see Bartlett & Gulati, 
supra note 10. 
 53. Schoenbaum, supra note 2, 1064-65. 
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Professor Schoenbaum helpfully places the supposed advantages of 
the sharing economy in the context of the enhancement of gender 
stereotyping that this economy encourages.  It is hard to know how to 
get a handle on the problem she identifies, given the momentum of 
the forces behind it.  Nevertheless, we cannot address the problem 
until we understand it.  Professor Schoenbaum has brought us a long 
way toward that understanding. 
